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13 
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR 
PATERNALISM 
Donald H. Regan 
One of the most troublesome problems concerning the 
appropriate extent of government interference with individuals' activity 
is the problem of paternalism-that is, the problem of when, if ever, 
the state may compel an individual to do or to refrain from some 
act or activity "for his own good." One would hardly know this was 
a troublesome problem just from looking at the literature on political 
and legal philosophy. It is hard to think of an influential philosophical 
discussion of the matter more recent than John Stuart Mill's. 1 But 
paternalism is a problem which keeps coming up in discussions among 
philosophers as well as in discussions among people concerned with 
practical questions about the propriety of particular pieces of legis­
lation, and it is a problem on which I think there is as yet no com­
pletely satisfactory view. 
Possibly the reason there has been so little writing on the subject 
of paternalism is that the simplest and most natural approach to the 
problem-the straightforward hedonistic utilitarian approach-leads 
so quickly to what is apparently a dead end. My purpose in writing 
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this paper is to suggest two other possible justifications for pater­
nalism, aside from pleasure-maximization, which are not, so· far as 
I know, part of the standard lore associated with the problem. It 
may be that my suggestions are part of other people's standard lore 
and that no one has ever seen fit to write them down. That is .a risk 
I shall have to take. 
I 
Before I present my "new" justifications of paternalism, I 
should like to rehearse very briefly the main points of what I take 
to be the standard dialectic of paternalism. In the context of a 
hedonistic-utilitarian (which we shall hereafter abbreviate as simply 
"utilitarian") approach to the problem of the justification of coercion 
by the state, there is one necessary and sufficient condition for pater­
nalistic coercion-namely, that the coercion will result in more pleasure 
or happiness overall for the individual coerced. 2 If people will be 
happier overall if they abstain from cigarettes, or from heroin, or if 
they wear seat belts in cars or helmets when riding motorcycles, then 
we should coerce them to do all of those things. That is all there is 
to it. 
The reason (perhaps I should say "one reason') why this single­
minded pleasure-maximizing approach is unsatisfactory is clear enough. 
Anyone who suggests that we are always justified in compelling people 
to do that which will make them happiest is ignoring another value 
which is not the same as happiness, the value of freedom of choice. 
It seems that individuals have a right to make bad choices, or choices 
which sacrifice their own future happiness to their present whim, if 
that's what they want. 
Already we see why paternalism is a problem. It is a problem 
precisely because in cases where paternalistic coercion would be 
justified on pleasure-maximizing grounds, two important values, plea­
sure or happiness on the one hand and freedom on the other, seem to 
be irreconcilably opposed. This is what I meant when I said that the 
simple straightforward approach leads quickly to an apparent deaJJ 
end. We have reached a head-on conflict of very high-level values 
before we have. fairly begun our investigation. 
To be sure, there are a few more standard moves. One such move 
is to suggest that paternalism is justified when the individual coerced 
lacks relevant information about the consequences of his acts. 3 
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Presumably this justification for paternalism gets its force from a 
feeling that ignorance is a sort of unfreedom. Since the person who 
lacks information is unfree even if we do not intervene to constrain 
his choice, we are not really decreasing his freedom by intervening, 
and the conflict between freedom and happiness never arises. Just 
why being uninformed seems to be a· way of being unfree is an inter­
esting question. Certainly it smacks more of a lack of "positive" 
freedom than of a lack of "negative" freedom, but as an excuse for 
paternalism ignorance is in reasonably good repute even with advocates 
of negative freedom. The reason is no doubt to be found in an intimate 
connection between human freedom and rationality, but to say just 
what that connection is is beyond my present powers. 4 
Now if our justification of paternalism is simply people's ignor­
ance, it might seem that we have a warrant not for coercing people 
but only for educating them. If the reason we feel justified in for­
bidding drugs is because we don't think users realize the danger to 
themselves, should we not concentrate on informing them of the 
danger, and then let them do as they please? In fact, there are a 
variety of possible claims we might put forth to justify coercion 
in particular cases. Sometimes there simply will not be time to educate 
the party coerced, as where an individual threatens to act in a way 
which will do him irreparable damage before we can convince him 
of what the facts are. In other cases, the party to be coerced may 
lack the expertise to understand or use the information he should 
have. Stretching the concept of information a bit, we might suggest 
that even where expertise is not in question, an individual might have 
all the facts within his cognitive grasp and still not really appreciate 
them. For example, someone might know all the medical facts about 
cigarettes and lung cancer and still fail to appreciate just how horrible 
it would be to die of cancer. In a similar vein, we might suggest that 
most people are simply incapable of taking very small probabilities 
properly into account, and this could be regarded as a sort of ignorance 
about consequences. With these arguments, and no doubt others like 
them, we can defend a good deal of paternalism with some persua­
siveness on the ground that we are interfering only where people 
lack information. 
Another move we might make, similar to the appeal to ignorance, 
is to claim that paternalism is justified when the subject of coercion 
is acting under an internal psychological compulsion. In this case 
also we might claim not to interfere with freedom, since the subject 
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of coercion is already unfree, and we might nonetheless open up 
very considerable opportunities for benevolent intervention. 
For some it may be that the arguments we have already sketched 
will suffice to construct a satisfying theory of when paternalism is 
appropriate and when it is not. For myself, I am not yet content. 
On the one hand,, it is not clear that even after we limit utilitarian 
paternalism to cases of incomplete information or psychological 
compulsion (or only the first of these) we have given freedom of 
choice its due. We are so seldom fully informed of the consequences 
of our acts, and we are so seldom quite free of unconscious motivation, 
that our whole lives .might be subject; to paternalistic supervision if 
there were no other restrictions. It is always possible to make the 
rule-utilitarian move of saying that hy and large government will 
do worse at arranging people's happiness than they would do them· 
selves, but that seems to leave our claim to freedom too dependent 
on a contingency. A somewhat more appealing move, which can he 
made in either an act· or a rule-utilitarian framework, would be to 
claim that some considerable degree of freedom is a necessary condi­
tion of being happy. Unfortunately, this claim is not obviously true 
-witness the cases of nuns, soldiers, and others who manage to be 
happy inside total institutions-and even if it were true it would still 
seem to subordinate to happiness something which is in fact an in­
dependent value of equal stature. 
I have just been suggesting that even a limited utilitarian paternalism 
llU!Y he too strong. I would also suggest that in other cases it may be 
too weak. I have a lingering feeling that it may be permissible to 
prevent cigarette smoking even by a smoker who has no family, who 
is clear-headed and as free of neuroses as a person can be, who is well 
informed about his chances of getting cancer and the general dimi­
nution of his life expectancy, and who just doesn't give a damn.5 
My conclusion, after this rapid survey of the standard moves, is 
that there is still considerable room for new approaches to the prob­
lem of paternalism. 
II 
The first suggestion I would li)rn to make is that we might re­
gard paternalism as justified by a policy of coercing people in order to 
maximize human freedom. Whereas utility-maximizing paternalism 
coerces people "for their own good" in the sense of "for their own 
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happiness," freedom-maximizing paternalism would coerce people 
"for their own good" in the sense of "for their own freedom." 
The notion of freedom-maximizing paternalism is suggested by 
Mill's example of a contract for slavery. Mill says that although we 
generally enforce contracts, because they are made in the exercise 
of that liberty which we must respect, we should not enforce contracts 
for slavery. The reason is that slavery is the negation of liberty, and 
it would he absurd to give significance, in the name of protecting 
liberty, to an act by which the contracting party purports to destroy 
his liberty absolutely. In Mill's words: "[B]y selling himself for a 
slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it beyond 
that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose 
which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. He 
is no longer free; but is thenceforth in a position which has no longer 
the presumption in its favor, that would he afforded by his voluntarily 
remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require that he 
should he free not to he free. It is not freedom to he allowed to 
alienate his freedom. "1 
Now if Mill is right about this-if the principle of freedom does 
not require that a man should he free to destroy his freedom com­
pletely-it seems that the principle of freedom also does not require 
that a man should he free to destroy his freedom partially. In other 
words, if our general reason for letting people do as they please is 
that we value freedom, and if it is a countervailing reason in the slavery 
case that what the agent pleases will destroy his freedom, then it seems 
equally a countervailing reason in the cigarette-smoking case or the seat 
belt case that what the agent pleases will destroy his freedom to some 
extent. 7 When I say cigarette smoking or not wearing a seat belt will 
destroy his freedom to some extent, I refer to the fact that these forms 
of conduct will, at least statistically, shorten his life span and may also 
lead to debilitating disease or crippling injury. 
It might he objected that there is a difference between the case 
of a contract for slavery and the case of smoking cigarettes, in that 
the former is essentially an act destroying freedom while the latter 
is only incidentally such an act. Now if what is meant by this is 
that the act of selling oneself to he a slave has no other consequence 
than the destruction of one's freedom, while the act of smoking a cigar­
ette, whatever it does to one's freedom, may also he productive of 
pleasure, then I think the argument is misguided. Presumably no 
one would sell himself into slavery unless he hoped thereby to 
accomplish something very important to him. If we were trying to 
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make up a plausible hypothetical case, we would posit a situation 
where selling himself into slavery was the only way some individual 
could secure the money for a very expensive operation which was 
necessary to save his child's life, or something similar. If this is the 
context in which the making of a contract for slavery is. being con­
sidered, it is clear that the act of selling oneself into slavery does 
have consequences other than the mere extinction of one's freedom, 
and very important consequences at that. 
Possibly what would he meant by saying that the act of selling 
oneself into slavery is essentially an act destroying freedom, while 
the act of cigarette smoking is only incidentally such an act; is not 
simply a matter of reckoning up the consequences, as the previous 
paragraph suggests. The claim may he rather that selling oneself 
into slavery is objectionable because the good consequences (saving 
the child) are obtained only through the mediation of the had 
consequences (abdicating one's freedom), whereas in the cigarette-
. smoking case the good and had consequences flow independently 
from the act, and the had consequences are not a means to the 
good. If this is what is meant, we are dealing with something like 
the Doctrine of Double Effect, and a full discussion would take 
us far afield. Accordingly, I shall drop the matter, after observing 
that I see no convincing argument, at least along the lines so far 
considered, for treating the slavery case and the cigarette case 
differently. 
A somewhat different objection might he raised. We were rather 
cavalier in the way we introduced the idea that cigarette smoking 
has as one of its consequences a diminution (statistically speaking, 
at least) of the smoker's freedom. It might he said that disease, 
Injury, and death are not ordinarily regarded as causes of "unfree­
dom," hut of disabilities or incapacities which are not strictly a 
matter of freedom at all. A long answer to this claim, involving a 
lengthy exposition of what we mean by "unfreedom," is possible. 
I shall content myself with a short answer, which seems adequate 
to this case. We are not trying to minimize unfreedom hut to max­
imize freedom, and what we mean by "freedom" in this connection 
includes abilities, capacities, and in general whatever is a precondition 
for any human activity. What we desire is that the largest number 
of people should have the widest possible i:ange of effective choice 
about what to do with themselves. From this point of view it is 
clear that death and injury and disease are all restrictions on freedom. 8 
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An entirely different objection might he raised against the whole 
notion of freedom-maximizing paternalism, namely, that it is absurd 
to speak of coercing someone in order to promote his freedom. In 
fact, it is the objection which is, if not absurd, at least ill-considered. 
It would he self-contradictory in some sense to speak of coercing 
someone in order to increase his freedom at the point where he 
was being coerced, or in the act with respect to which he was being 
coerced. 9 But we are not speaking of that. We are speaking of 
coercing someone in order to increase his freedom at other times 
and in respect of other acts. In this there is no contradiction at 
all, just :is there is no contradiction in the utilitarian paternalist 
program of promoting people's happiness by making them do things 
which make them unhappy at the moment where the coercion is 
effective. 
We have left until last the most telling criticism of the freedom­
maximizing approach, which is that it assumes freedom can he 
quantified and summed up, at least intrapersonally, and interper­
sonally as well if our freedom-paternalism is to he connected with 
a broader principle of freedom-maximization. '0 This criticism is 
plainly unanswerable, if in order to answer it we must provide 
anything like a full description of how freedom is measured and 
compared. But the parallel criticism of hedonistic utilitarianism is 
unanswerable in the same way, which has not prevented many 
people from being utilitarians and many more from believing that 
utility-maximization is one important moral consideration. 
We can say a few things about how freedom is measured. First 
of all, it is clear that we do not determine the extent of a person's 
freedom just by counting up the actions available to him (or which 
will be available, at all relevant times) and saying that the greater 
the number of actions, the greater his freedom. For one thing, 
there is no obviously satisfactory criterion for individuating actions. 
More important, however, is the fact that freedom to do some 
things is much more important than freedom to do others, and 
any criterion based on mere counting would ignore such differences. 
In deciding how great a person's freedom is, we need to consider 
not merely how many different things he can do, hut what the 
things he can do are. Freedom to do X will presumably count for 
more than freedom to do Y whenever X is more pleasurable to the 
particular individual than Y, or more highly valued by a rational 
individual than Y, or more essential to the individual's sense of 
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his personal identity than Y, and so on. The considerations just 
listed do not exhaust the possibilities, and each must be taken as 
including the qualification "other things being equal," if only be­
cause the considerations we have listed might conflict for particular 
values of X and Y. 
Now it may seem that in the last paragraph we replaced a nearly 
hopeless problem (how to count up actions) with an utterly impos­
sible one (how to evaluate bundles of freedom in terms of the rela­
tive importance, according to various criteria, of the available actions). 
I do not think that is the case. We may•·be no closer to a well-defined 
procedure for ranking bundles of freedom (in fact, we may be further 
away from such a procedure), but the new problem is one that may 
be more amenable to acceptable intuitive judgments than the old 
one. If the criterion for ranking bundles of freedom is simply the 
number of available actions, my intuition says that almost all the 
bundles that arise in practice are going to contain the same infinite 
number of actions, and therefore be equally valuable. My intuition 
also says, however, that the conclusion that almost all bundles of 
freedom which arise in practice are equally valuable is ludicrous. 
Once the criterion is expanded to include reference to the importance 
of the actions, I find that I can make some rough intuitive judgments, 
just as I can make rough intuitive judgments about the relative 
happiness of various possible lives. What I am suggesting, then, is, 
first_, that freedom-maximization may be no more susceptible than 
utility-maximization to the criticism of vagueness, and, second, that 
if the notion of freedom-maximization, like the notion of utility­
maximization, strikes a responsive chord from somewhere among 
our moral intuitions, then we should perhaps struggle along with 
this vague notion just as we do with others equally vague. 11 
The most disconcerting part of any utilitarian argument is the 
part where the author waves his hands and produces out of nowhere 
conclusions about the morality of particular kinds of acts or par­
ticular practices. Still, having suggested freedom-maximization, and 
having suggested that I have some intuitions about when freedom 
is maximized, I feel obliged to apply the principle to a few examples 
of paternalism. Reluctantly, therefore, I shall now briefly assume 
the role of a moral clairvoyant. 
Let us consider first the case of the man who wishes to sell 
himself into slavery in order to secure money for an operation for 
his otherwise doomed child. Although it was Mill's discussion of 
this case which suggested freedom-maximizing paternalism to us, it 
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is not at all clear that, even if we accept the freedom-maximizing 
principle, we should prevent the enforcement of the contract. The 
first question is what is the net effect on the father's freedom of 
disallowing the contract? This is not an easy question, since saving 
his child may be more important to the man we are talking about 
than anything else he will ever do. Depending on whether it is his 
only child, and on his views about posterity, it may be important 
not merely in the sense that he badly wants to do it, but in the 
sense that it touches his deepest feelings about his own worth and 
identity. We should also remember that as a slave the man may 
have a degree of freedom which is not insignificant. He will have 
absolutely no legal freedom, but it is the freedom he is actually 
accorded by his master which is of primary importance, and that 
could be quite considerable. In sum, I think we might construct 
a plausible case in which, even considering the father's freedom 
alone, we would allow the contract. In general, however, I would 
expect it to he the case that, considering the father's freedom alone, 
the contract should not he allowed. At this point we need to re­
member, though, that other considerations besides the father's free­
dom are relevant. Our final decision must surely take into account 
not merely the father's freedom hut also the child's freedom, or 
the child's happiness, or both. When we weigh these things, the 
father's decision to sell himself probably ought to stand. 
I think our reluctance to allow the father to sell himself into 
slavery is based on two feelings which are not directly related to 
our freedom-maximizing principle. First, we refuse to accept the 
conditions of the problem, in particular that becoming a slave is 
really the only way to save the child. We feel that if a father ever 
found himself in such a position-and more generally if anyone 
ever found himself in a position where he was denied something 
so important that he might reasonably decide to sell himself as a 
slave in order to get what he was denied-there would he something 
drastically wrong with the broader social context, and we ought to 
focus on changing the social context instead of coolly allowing the 
contract for slavery to he enforced. The second reason we are not 
disposed to allow the father to sell himself is that we are concerned 
with unfreedom, and not just with freedom (here I qualify a hit 
what I said earlier in connection with death, injury, and disease 
as causes of unfreedom), at least in the following sense: Assume 
that the child, if allowed to die, and the father, if allowed to 
become a slave, would he losing exactly the same quantity of 
198 DONALD H. REGAN 
freedom. We would prefer the child to die than the father to 
become a slave because there is nothing positively offensive to 
our valuation of freedom in someone's being dead, whereas there 
is something very offensive in someone's being alive but totally 
unfree. 
Consider now a related case, the case of suicide. Or rather, let 
us consider two cases of suicide. First, the man who is a terminal 
cancer patient, who is bed-ridden and in constant pain, hut still 
sufficiently clear-headed so that we regard him as capable of rational 
choice, and who wants to end his life. Second, the man who is not 
suffering from any gross physical, psychological, or financial handicap, 
hut who hasn't many friends or a job he likes, and who simply finds 
life a burden which he is convinced he would like to lay aside once 
and for all. I do not think either of these men should he prevented 
from committing suicide, hut it might seem that freedom-maximizing 
paternalism would justify preventing the suicide in both cases, even 
though we assume that no one other than the described individuals 
is affected. After all, once either of them is dead, he has no freedom 
of any kind. So long as he is alive, he has some freedom, which we 
may maintain by coercion at the expense of a relatively minor 
limitation on the things he is allowed to do. The limitation looks 
very small if we describe the things the would-be suicide is not 
allowed to do as "shooting pistols into his head," "swallowing 
poison," and so on, by enumeration. The limitation may not look 
quite so small if we describe what the subject is not allowed to do 
more candidly as "committing suicide," since that is at least an 
act that is likely to he regarded by the person who wants to do 
it as fairly important. But we might still feel that the freedom to 
commit suicide is less than the freedom which is lost in being dead. 
One counterargument is available which is peculiar to the case 
of the cancer patient. That is the argument that the cancer victim, 
once he reaches the agonizing final stages of that illness, will he 
incapable of rational activity and will he subhuman. He will he a 
positive offense to our value of freedom, like the man who becomes 
a slave, in a way in which the man who simply doesn't enjoy his 
life is not. 
There is another argument, however, which applies equally to 
the cancer patient and the man who is merely tired of life and which 
sways me to believe we should allow the suicide even though we 
recognize the principle of freedom-maximization. When we prevent 
someone from committing suicide, we are not merely preventing 
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that act. We are coercing the would-he suicide into every other act 
that he does. We are coercing him into getting up in the morning, 
dressing, eating, watching television-whatever he fills his time with. 
None of this is really done by choice. None of this is done freely. 12 
We are assuming, of course, that the desire for an end to one's life 
persists. If the wish to commit suicide is only a passing fancy, then 
we are probably justified in preventing suicide by one in whom the 
desire to commit suicide is transitory. But if the desire to commit 
suicide does not pass, then preventing someone from committing 
suicide poisons everything else he does in a way in which preventing 
him from smoking cigarettes or compelling him to wear a motorcycle 
helmet if he rides a motorcycle does not. This is the reason why the 
freedom-maximization principle does not entail that suicide should 
always be prevented. 
Finally, let us look at the case of forbidding someone to smoke 
cigarettes, or compelling him to wear a seat belt or a motorcycle 
helmet. As my comments made in passing in the previous paragraph 
suggest, these are cases where I have some feeling that coercion is 
justified. I have this feeling even in the face of assumptions which 
rule out the possibility of defending coercion by reference to the 
coercee 's lack of information. And my feeling seems stronger than 
whatever feeling I have that it might possibly be all right to coerce 
people just to make them happier. I think the feeling may be account­
ed for by appeal to the principle that we may coerce people in 
order to protect their freedom. The restrictions involved in forbid­
ding cigarettes or requiring a motorcyclist to wear a helmet appear 
as relatively slight incursions into the realm of individual freedom. 
The diminution of the individual's freedom which might result from 
a shorter life, cancer, emphysema, or an accident in which serious 
head injury was sustained is considerable. As I observed previously, 
forbidding cigarettes or requiring a helmet would not poison other 
activities, or cause other apparently free activity to be really unfree. 
In short, freedom-maximizing paternalism is made to order for the 
purpose of justifying coercion in such matters as these. 
Of course, when I say that "forbidding cigarettes or requiring 
a helmet would not poison other activities," I am making an obser­
vation which I believe to he true in most cases and true contingently, 
not one which I believe is true universally or necessarily. It might 
he that if some particular individual were denied cigarettes, he 
would be so wracked by nervous tension which he could not other­
wise assuage that he would he incapable of any meaningful activity. 
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Such an individual should be allowed cigarettes, even on a freedom­
maximizing ground. Similarly, there might be individuals who, if 
they were only allowed to ride motorcycles wearing helmets, would 
prefer not to ride at all. Whether these individuals ought to be 
allowed to ride without helmets would depend on just how impor­
tant riding was to them, but such individuals are already sufficiently 
unusual, I think, so that they might turn out to qualify for an 
exception as well. 
We should also take note of a distinction between a prohibition 
against cigarettes or a requirement of motorcycle helmets and pro­
hibitions against dangerous activiti�s such as mountain climbing. 
It is plausible to suppose that there are some people for whom it 
is very important to engage in particular high-risk activities, or 
even to engage in just any high-risk activity, so long as it is suf­
ficiently risky. Such people ought not necessarily to be restrained. 
The point about cigarette smoking and riding a motorcycle without 
a helmet is that these are activities which it would be difficult or 
impossible to build a life style around and which few people if any 
engage in because of the risk involved. 
Before we leave the freedom-maximizing principle, one comment 
about the exact status of the principle is in order. I have written 
as if the freedom-maximizing principle Jllight be taken as compll)tely 
displacing the utility-maximizing principle. If we accepted freedom 
maximizing and ignored utility completely, we might find ourselves 
coercing individuals on paternalistic grounds when the result of 
coercion was to secure a small gain in freedom at the cost of a large 
loss of utility. Now there might he people to whom such a result 
would he acceptable, hut I do not count myself among them. Per­
haps we should coerce where a large gain in freedom can he secured 
at the cost of a small loss of utility, hut freedom is not the only 
goal to be pursued any more than utility is. Where the freedom­
maximization principle and the utility-maximization principle con­
flict, we may still have a difficult problem about how the conflict 
should he resolved. But we have not quite the same problem we 
started with-that is, we have not quite the same conflict between 
utility and freedom which we ran into at the beginning of the first 
section of this paper. Suggesting the freedom-maximizing principle, 
or, in other words, suggesting that our concern for freedom might 
be embodied in a teleological principle rather than a deontological 
one, reveals that there is a way of taking freedom into account 
while at the same reducing the number of cases in which utility 
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and freedom conflict. The traditional way of looking at the pater­
nalism problem seems to assume that any interference with free 
choice in any particular case is prima facie unjustifiable, with the 
result that every decision in favor of coercion must come as the 
resolution of a conflict between principles. Under the freedom­
maximizing approach, any coercion is presumptively unjustifiable, 
but may turn out to be completely innocent, if it is shown that 
the overall effect on freedom is positive. 13 In such cases-and it 
is cases like cigarettes and heroin, seat belts and motorcycle helmets 
that I have in mind-there would then he no conflict of principles. 
The principle which reflects our concern for freedom and the 
principle which reflects our concern for utility would point in the 
same direction. 14 
III 
So far we have looked at one "new" justification for 
paternalism. I should like now to make a second suggestion, which 
is considerably more radical, and to my mind considerably more 
interesting. That is the suggestion that we can bring much pater­
nalistic legislation under the "harm principle," so that it presents 
no special problem at all. By the "harm principle" I mean any 
formulation of that central tenet of Mill's On Liberty: "That the 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others." 15 Plainly, the reason why paternalism is ordinarily 
thought to present a problem is that it appears to be a matter of 
exercising power over an individual, not to prevent harm to others, 
but to prevent harm to himself. If there were some good reason 
for regarding the harm done as done to a person other than the 
agent, the problem would disappear. I think there is a good reason 
for regarding the harm done by the agent as done to another, at 
least in many cases where paternalism seems justified. To bring 
out that reason, it will be useful to consider a specific case. 
Let us consider statutes, of which there are a number, which 
make it an offense to ride a motorcycle without wearing a helmet. 
Such statutes are frequently attacked on the ground that they 
compel the cyclist to do something for nobody's good hut his 
own and that if he wants to run the risk of serious injury, that 
is his own business. 16 From this point the defender of the helmet 
202 DONALD H. REGAN 
statute might take the argument off into the question of com­
pleteness of information. That line we shall ignore. Another sug­
gestion that the defender of the statute frequently makes goes as 
follows: "Anyone who rides a motorcycle without a helmet is 
risking serious injury. If he is seriously injured, then he is very 
likely at some stage to become a public charge. He will he cared 
for in a public hospital, or even if he can afford private care, he 
will end up unemployed and drii.wing public compensation. Even 
this may not happen in every case, hut certainly in statistical terms 
the helmetless cyclist is imposing a burden on public assistance 
funds. Since public funds must he raised by taxation, the helmetless 
cyclist is in fact hurting someone besides himself." 
The argument just stated is not very satisfying. For one thing, 
when we consider just what the statistical burden which the motor­
cyclist imposes on the public treasury comes to, it may well be that 
the "harm" done by the motorcyclist to others hy this route is 
outweighed hy the utility to him of riding without a helmet. Further, 
the tenuousness of the connection between the conduct and the 
"harm" gives the argument something of the false ring of rational­
ization. In any case, the opponent of the helmet statute, in order 
apparently to avoid the force of the argument, has only to steel 
himself and say something like the following: "You go too fast. 
You say that the cyclist will he a burden on public assistance 
funds, hut the cyclist never asked for public assistance. The cyclist 
I have in mind values his freedom, and he realizes that the price 
of freedom is to suffer the consequences of his choices. If he suffers 
a serious injury, leave him to manage as best he can. Leave him to 
private charity, or let him die in the street. So long as you are prepared 
to do that, his riding without a helmet doesn't hurt anyone hut 
himself." 
At this stage the defender of the statute might say: "But we 
can't leave him in the street. That would be inhuman. It would 
cost us more in suffering to leave him in the street than it would 
cost to care for him properly. So you see, he has harmed us, either 
way." The obvious retort is: "If you value freedom at all, you must 
admit that one person's mere emotional distress at another's behavior 
is no justification for making that behavior a crime. If the cyclist 
insists on dying in a public thoroughfare, let us remove him, as we 
would any other offensive exhibitionist. But so long as he removes 
himself from the public eye, he is as entitled to die as to read a 
dirty book." 
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Now the defender of the statute, if he has not turned on his 
heel and stalked off, might say something like the following: "It's 
not simply a matter of squeamishness that makes me want to help 
the injured cyclist. I have a moral obligation to. Being denied assist­
ance when one is injured is a punishment too great to visit on any­
one's head just for making a foolish choice, even if the choice was 
precisely to risk that punishment. The cyclist may have made his 
original choice with full knowledge, but he must regret it now. I 
have a general duty to help people in need. My duty would be 
satisfied here only if the cyclist did not want help at the time he 
needed help. The fact that he decided he would do without help 
before he needed it is quite irrelevant." From here the defender of 
the statute would go on to say that being put in a position where 
one must undertake some burden or expense if one is to satisfy 
one's moral obligations (as opposed to reacting on the basis of 
one's feelings of pity or horror) is harm, so the cyclist has harmed 
someone after all. 
At this point it seems the defender of the statute is in a strong 
position, and may have won the argument. What remains to be 
observed is that if he has won the argument, he has done so by 
hitting on a suggestion that makes most of the argument as we 
have described it superfluous. What the defender of the statute is 
really saying is that the cyclist at the time of deciding to ride 
without a helmet and the cyclist at the time of his turning up 
with a broken head are different people, and the choice of one 
doesn't bind the other. But if the cyclist is a different person at 
the later time from the person he was at the time of his original 
decision, then the cyclist at the time of his original decision has 
harmed another person, and the initial attack on the statute, to 
the effect that it violated the "harm principle," was mistaken. 
Now it must be admitted that we would ordinarily speak of 
the cyclist as a single person throughout the events which befell 
him. And it must also be admitted that if we start regarding as separate 
persons what we would ordinarily regard as separate time-slices or 
time-segments of the same person, we will have opened a can of 
worms. Still, I think the suggestion that we should regard separate 
time-segments as separate persons, at least for some purposes, cannot 
be ignored. The argument we have just made about the cyclist hurting 
"another" may seem considerably more plausible if we think, say, 
about a man who smokes for twenty years, then quits for ten, and then 
204 DONALD H. REGAN 
turns up with lung cancer, of which his smoking was a causal 
antecedent. Here, it seems, nature has been distinctly unfair. 
A similar sort of case may be suggested in connection with moral 
responsibility and the infliction of punishment. Even supposing we 
hold a retributivist view of punishment, I think we would be reluc­
tant to punish an embezzler whom we find out ten years after his 
crime and nine-and-a-half years after he has squandered all his ill­
gotton gains and returned to a life which has since been absolutely 
blameless. The reason is that although the criminal was (and perhaps 
timelessly "is") deserving of punish�ent, the criminal is no longer 
accessible to us. Inhabiting the criminal's body and social role, we 
find a new man. 
The suggestion that for purposes of apportioning blame and 
punishment our ordinary criteria of personal identity may be in­
adequate is at least as old as Locke. 17 What I suggest in addition 
is that the problem of who should be allowed to suffer the natural 
(i.e., physical, psychological, and so on) consequences of a person's 
choices is much like the problem of who should be required to suffer 
the moral consequences of a person's choices. If different time­
segments of one "person" may be distinguishable in the latter con­
text, I thiqk they may be in the former as well. 18 
The difficult question, of course, is still before us. If we adopt 
any such view as the one I have suggested, the crucial question is, 
just what makes different time-segments of what we would ordinarily 
regard as one person "different" people? Let us start with the case 
of punishment. I would say, roughly, that the embezzler is a dif­
ferent person when we discover him ten years later if he is no longer 
the sort of person who would embezzle, if placed in the same situation 
in which he did so originally (or a similar situation). What this means, 
of course, is far from clear. Many moralists, concerned about preserving 
freedom of the will, would probably want to hold that the question 
"Would Jones, if placed in the following situation, embezzle?" fre­
quently does not have a well-defined answer. The theory of identity­
of-persons-for-purposes-of-retribution which I have suggested seems 
to require, however, that the question "Is Jones the sort of person 
who, if placed in the following situation, would embezzle?" should 
have a well-defined answer. In that case, the second question, about 
what sort of person Jones is, cannot be just the same as the first 
question, about what Jones would do. Perhaps the second question 
is about what Jones would "probably" do, or what he would be 
strongly disposed to do, or what he might do without greatly sur-
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prising those who knew him intimately, or something along these 
lines. 
If we press on, assuming that further reflection would provide 
us with a satisfactory sense of "the sort of person who . . ., " the 
first thing we notice is the following. Our embezzler may, after ten 
years, be the same person for some purposes and at the same time 
be a different person for others. Thus, suppose the embezzler com· 
mitted, at the same time he committed embezzlement, an unrelated 
aggravated assault. It is at least conceivable that after ten years the 
embe�zler has grown much more conscious of duties of trust without 
becoming any more disposed to control a volatile temper which 
produces occasional physical aggression. In such a case, I think we 
might hold it inappropriate to punish the embezzler now for his 
embezzlement, but still appropriate to punish him for the assault 
(for which we assume he has not been previously punished). 19 
Returning to our main topic of paternalism, what, if anything, 
makes the motorcyclist a different person after his accident? The 
answer, I think, is that the motorcyclist is a different person, in 
the relevant respect, if he is no longer the sort of person who would 
ignore his future well-being for the sake of small increments of 
present utility. Of course, it is not certain that having the accident 
will produce any such change in the motorcyclist. But it seems 
likely to. In many cases, I should think, the cyclist will not merely 
wish he had behaved differently in the past, but will have a new 
appreciation of the virtue of prudence, and will alter his attitude 
toward risk in the future. Suppose the cyclist is not chastened and 
suffers no change in his dispositions toward risky behavior as a 
result of his experience. Does that mean we should not help him? 
Possibly, but only if we think the cyclist will not change in the 
relevant respect further in the future. After all, the cyclist who has 
been injured without being educated no more has the right to harm, 
by refusing help, any of his future selves who will have learned 
prudence than the cyclist who has not been injured has the right 
to harm, by not wearing a helmet, future selves who would be 
educated by an accident. In short, we are entitled to refuse help, 
and we should decline to coerce in the first place, only if the cyclist 
is incorrigible. 20 
It may occur to the reader to wonder why, if I am prepared 
to carry my unorthodox suggestion about personal identity as far 
as I have, I do not simply go the whole way and say that the cyclist 
is a different person at every moment in time. That would allow 
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us to avoid the difficult questions we have wrestled with in the 
last few paragraphs about when people are the same at different 
times and when they are not. The reason for my reluctance to take 
this drastic step is that it would seem to undermine our whole 
concept of freedom. Freedom is concerned with making choices, 
especially, we like to think, with making rational choices. But 
rational choice requires deliberation and essentially involves time. 
If no one is ever the same person at successive instants, how can 
anyone ever make a rational choice, or a choice for himself? We 
might, of course, redefine rationality as an attribute, not of persons, 
but of series of persons which correspond to what we used to think 
of as persons. But no such radical reconstruction is required, at 
least in the present context. In connection with the justification of 
paternalism, all we need to recognize is that persons may, despite 
bodily continuity, become different persons for some purposes as 
they change over time. If we concentrate on consequences which 
are drastic, or which are considerably removed in time from the 
choices from which they flow, or preferably both, then what I have 
suggested about the attenuation over time of personal-identity-for­
moral-purposes seems to help in understanding our paternalistic 
impulses, and may help in justifying them. 
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ternalism I discuss in section II of this paper. On the whole, though, that 
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Zit should be noted that throughout this paper I am adopting the view­
point of an "ideal legislator," and even that in a very strong sense. I am 
considering when coercion would be justified from the point of view of an 
omniscient paternalist, who· not only knows everything about the individual 
he is coercing and the consequences of various choices by that individual 
but who also has at his disposal means of coercion which can discriminate 
perfectly between different individuals and different acts. Thus, our pater­
nalist need not frame general prohibitions and weigh the good consequences 
of such prohibitions as applied to some coercees against the bad consequences 
of the same prohibitions as applied to others. Nor need he take into account 
such problems, which may in practice be the most important connected with 
paternalism, as the effect of certain kinds of paternalistic legislation on the 
administration of the legal system generally. In other words, I am not speak­
ing in this paper at a very practical level. It seems to me, however, that 
before we can decide what sorts of paternalistic prohibitions are justified 
in practice, we need to know, or at least to have an idea, what sort would 
be justified for my ideal paternalist. Hence my concern with what I recognize 
is a very abstract formulation of the problem. 
'Similarly, it is widely accepted that certain statuses, such as infancy or 
imbecility, justify paternalism. My present concern is not with the question 
of what statuses justify paternalism, but with the question of when, if ever, 
we are justified in coercing an individual who has a good general claim not 
to be coerced, in other words, who is, to the same extent as the rest of us, 
a mature and responsible adult. 
•I might have taken refuge in a more standard "beyond the scope of 
this essay," but if I knew what the connection between freedom and 
rationality was, I should be writing a different essay, and a more impor­
tant one. 
BI have the same lingering feeling about the justifiability of prohibiting 
heroin, requiring the wearing of seat belts in cars and helmets on motor­
cycles, and so on. Generally when I mention one of these cases, I shall 
intend it as a stand-in for all cases of the same type. What counts as the 
"same type" the reader is left to infer from the discussion below. 
•On Liberty (Everyman ed., 1910), p. 158. 
7Qf course, almost any choice will "destroy the agent's freedom to 
some extent" in the sense of reducing or eliminating his freedom to do 
some particular acts at various times in the future. But it is only a much 
smaller class of choices which will "destroy the agent's freedom to some 
extent" in the stronger sense of leaving him, on the whole, significantly 
less free after the choice than he would have been had he made a different 
choice. Obviously, a principle which goes under the name "freedom-maxi­
mization" is concerned with preventing choices of the second kind, not 
the first. 
BThe inclusion of death along with injury and disease raises a question 
which proves troublesome for other "maximizing" theories as well. Are we 
really out to maximize human freedom to the extent that we might prohibit 
abortion or birth control so long as the totality of human freedom would be 
increased by increasing the number of people? I have no wish to undertake 
a discussion of that problem in this paper. I think we can distinguish between 
freedom, or happiness, or whatever, of people who actually exist, at some 
point iii time, independently of our decision about coercion (or other moral 
decision), and of people who do not. If we can't make some such distinction, 
then the appeal of freedom-maximization is considerably lessened, along with 
the appeal of traditional utilitarianism. 
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9 This sentence makes it clear that I have cast my lot generally with the 
"negative" rather than the "positive" sense of freedom. Even so, I have in­
cluded the qualification "in some sense" to take care of peculiar cases, like 
the case of an individual who is under a psychological compulsion to do one 
particular act in some situation, hut whom we can threaten with a sufficiently 
high sanction to override the compulsion, and who then finds himself free 
to choose among a wide variety of acts. 
•0Strictly, we would not need a cardinal measure of freedom if we were 
always concerned with only one person at a time. An ordinal scale ranking 
"bundles" of freedom for that person would suffice. If considerations of 
risk were introduced in the same way they may he introduced into utility 
theory, we might find ourselves with a cardinal measure, which was defined 
only up to a linear transformation. Even with more than one person, we 
might find ways of making decisions which took everyone's freedom into 
account without relying on interpersonal comparisons, such as a generalized 
Nash arbitration scheme. (See Luce & Raiffa, Games and Decisions, pp. 124-
134, 349-350.) Such methods of making decisions affecting more than one 
person would fit uncomfortably, however, under the rubric of "freedom­
maximization." What we say in the text is sufficiently fuzzy so that it prob­
ably doesn't matter much whether we regard ourselves as searching for ordinal 
or cardinal measures of freedom. The main object is to suggest that freedom­
maximization may not he much vaguer in principle than utility-maximization, 
and utilitarian moral philosophers have, for the most part, managed to ignore 
the fascinating complications of modern decision theory. 
11 For the reader who would still claim to have absolutely no sense of 
when one bundle of freedom is "greater" than another which neither includes 
it nor is included in it, I would suggest that he consider whether he does not 
have some intuitions about when one interference with freedom is "greater;' 
than another which is logically unrelated. Thus, is it not clear that a prohi­
bition against traveling in any self-propelled vehicle would, in general, he a 
greater interference with personal freedom than a prohibition against wearing 
purple ties? I admit that examples like this don't get us very far. But they 
may shake the utter skeptic, to whom this footnote is addressed. 
•z Instead of claiming that we coerce the would-he suicide into "whatever 
he fills his time with," it might be somewhat more accurate to say we coerce 
him into the disjunction of all the things he might fill his time with, but 
the point is the same. For a person who would really rather he dead, one 
way of filling his time is much like another. 
13 I use "prima facie unjustifiable" and "presumptively unjustifiable" in 
what I take to he well-accepted senses, or at least senses parallel to well­
accepted senses of "prima facie wrong" and "presumptively wrong." Very 
roughly, an act is prima facie wrong if it possesses some feature which is 
always wrong-making, and by virtue of which it will be wrong sans phrase 
except when it has some other right-making feature. An act is presumptively 
wrong if it has some feature which is generally indicative of wrongness. 
••In view of this last paragraph, we may have strained unnecessarily to 
try to make plausible the conclusion that preventing suicide is not required 
by freedom-maximization. Perhaps preventing suicide would maximize free­
dom, but only at too great a cost in utility. Even if we defend allowing 
suicide in this way, however, the case is stronger, the less freedom is being 
sacrificed when the suicide is allowed. Our argument was not wasted, then, 
even if we may have overreached ourselves by stating the' conclusion as 
strongly as we did. 
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1s on Liberty (Everyman ed., 1910), p. 73. 
1&Jt is worth noting that it is almost always possible to find some way 
in which an apparently paternalistic piece of legislation could be held to 
prevent harm to others, even without resort to the "burden on public funds" 
argument discussed further on in the text. Thus, it has been pointed out to 
me by my colleague Vince Blasi that the requirement of motorcycle helmets 
might decrease the chance of injury to others when a motorcyclist has an 
accident, by making it less likely that he will be stunned and lose control 
of his vehicle completely. In the case of cigarettes it could be argued, as 
another colleague, Doug Kahn, has suggested, that the smoker harms impres­
sionable children by setting them a bad example. 
17 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, ch. xxvii. This is 
not the place to argue about just what Locke's theory of personal identity 
is. In fact, I think that in the chapter cited he suggests at least two different 
theories, one of which is not unlike the theory I outline in the text below. 
Since I do not propose to indulge in exegesis, I will at least direct the doubtful 
reader's attention to the Essay, Bk. II, ch. xxvii, s s 16-26. 
1a Derek Parfit has argued convincingly that questions of personal identity 
are questions of degree, and Parfit, I am sure, would accept the general notion 
that the cyclist or the embezzler might be different persons at different times. 
See "Personal Identity," Philosophical Review, LXXX (1971 ), 3. Unfortunately, 
Parfit's discussion centers around hypothetical cases of fission and fusion of 
consciousness, and is aimed at establishing the possibility that what we ordi­
narily speak of as one person is a series of more or less closely connected 
ancestral and descendant selves. Parfit does not give any attention to the 
question of just where one self becomes another. He does point out that if 
we accept this view of personal identity, then the principle of prudence, rather 
than being at odds with the principle of concern for others, may be deducible 
from it-and may in fact have no other support ! This observation of course 
exactly parallels our suggestion that paternalism may be justified by appeal to 
the "harm principle." 
19 One untoward consequence of the theory I am suggesting might be that 
it would place a great strain on our adherence to another principle, the pro­
hibition against punishing innocents even when good consequences would 
result. When the standard case of securing good consequences by punishing 
someone who is innocent is that of the sheriff framing somebody for a crime 
he didn't commit in order to avoid a riot, we may be able to say firmly "No­
that would be an outrage" in part because of our belief that such cases wouldn't 
come up often, so the good consequences lost would not be significant. Our 
new principle, if taken seriously, might require nonpunishment of many persons 
for crimes which earlier inhabitants of the bodies they are attached to unques­
tionable did commit. To let too many such persons go unpunished might 
completely undermine the use of punishment as a deterrent. Of course, we 
aren't certain punishment has much deterrent effect anyway, but so far we 
haven't given up. Even aside from deterrence, the new theory might require 
us to discard any judicial system of punishment, even as retribution. Under 
the present judicial system and the ordinary view of personal identity, we 
know that some innocent persons are convicted, but we console ourselves 
with the thought that. the number is small and that no one who is innocent 
is convicted "intentionally" despite knowledge of his innocence which is 
attributable to the judicial system. If we adopt the suggested view of personal 
identity, we might have to conclude that any system of judicial punishment 
would convict so many innocent persons that it would be insupportable. 
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zo At this point a difficulty arises which is connected with the problem 
of "possible persons" (persons whose existence is prevented by abortion or 
birth control) which we encountered in section II. We have suggested that 
the cyclist may be coerced because of the possibility that he may develop 
into a person who is different in a relevant respect, such as attitude toward 
risk, or something of the sort. But we have also admitted that the cyclist 
may not develop into such a person. Are we not then interfering to protect 
merely possible future selves of the cyclist, and if we are prepared to protect 
these merely possible persons, why not the unborn? I think of two possible 
answers, or suggestions for answers, both of which have some plausibility. 
First, the possible persons we are protecting in the case of the cyclist might 
exist even without our intervention, •·even though they also might not (and 
might not ever exist even if we do intervene). Possible persons who are about 
to be prevented from existing by abortion or birth control quite certainly 
will not exist without our intervention. (Spelling this out might involve us 
in difficulties about the individuation of possible persons.) Second, it seems 
that we may be justified in treating differently possible persons who are 
not related by bodily or psychological continuity to any actual persons, and 
possible persons who are so related. (This requires a bit of spelling out too, 
to explain how a merely possible person could be related by bodily or 
psychological continuity to any actual person. I would suggest, however, 
that the reader who can't see approximately how this would go just isn't 
trying.) 
